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OPERATION OF THE MEXICAN LABOR LAW 
(Part II of Two Parts) 
Joseph M. Cormack* 
4. STRIKES90 
[Vol. 7 
It is remarkable how similarly this species of class struggle (a 
more appropriate term in this connection than collective bargain-
ing) works out among peoples of different temperaments and his-
torical backgrounds, having divergent economic viewpoints and 
many other differences. With the Mexicans, as with us, elaborate 
governmental machinery has been set up in order to achieve peace-
ful settlement of labor disputes- Trueba has written a four-
volume work upon Mexican labor law procedure91 - and yet the 
outcome of most controversies depends upon the prevailing na-
tional current of psychological and economic conditions, in-
fluenced to a minor degree by the Lewisite qualities of the nego-
tiators. As a generalization, it seemed to me that the strikes in 
Mexico are neither more nor less frequent, important or signifi-
cant than with us, producing in each country about the same 
amount of benefit or injury, depending upon the point of view. 
*Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary in Virginia. Acknowledg .. 
ments are made at p. 301 of this volume. 
90 See, in general: Labor Law, §§ 258 ff.; 2 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO 
DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 745 ff.; ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, DERECHO PENAL DEL. 
TRABAJO (1948), DERECHO PnocESAL DEL TRABAJO (1941), and EvoLUCION DE LA 
HUELGA (1950). 
Professor Cepeda has made a detailed classification of the various forms of labor 
conflicts: Rodolfo Cepeda Villareal, Concepto y Clasificaci6n de los Conflictos de· 
Trabajo, 30 Revista del Trabajo 7 (1947, Num. 119), reprinted, 6 El Foro 10 0949, 
Num. 1). For other classifications: J. JEsus CASTORENA, MANUAL DE DERECHO 0BRERO 
(1932) 266, 321; 2 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, op. cit. supra at 748; ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, 
EVOLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 271. 
Strikes by government employees (not including those working for corporations,. 
such as Petroleos Mexicanos, owned by the government) are covered by special statute· 
( Estatuto de los Trabajadores a! Servicio de los Poderes de Ia Union) and are not 
treated in this article. The statutory provisions are quoted: ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINAp 
EvOLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 232. 
91 DERECHO PROCESAL DEL TRABAJO (1941). 
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The right to strike is expressly protected by the Constitution92 
- De la Cueva has stated that Mexico was the first country to 
make the strike a juridical act. 93 The Labor Board is required to 
promptly94 "qualify"96 each strike as legally "existent,"96 "non-
existent" or "unlawful" ( ilicita). A strike duly voted by a major-
ity of the workers for a proper purpose, and commenced in ac-
cordance with the required procedure (as to notices, period for 
arbitration, etc.), is "existent," without regard to the merits of 
9 2 Article 123 07, 18). The Fifth Article provides, with exceptions relating to 
governmental activities, that no one ought to be obliged to render personal services 
without just compensation or without his free consent. A portion of the Article has 
been quoted in the text. 
93 2 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 813. 
9 4 The Labor Law sets the impossible requirement of a decision within 48 hours 
from the time work is suspended. § 269. 
95 A strike which has not been qualified by a Labor Board is sometimes referred to 
(incorrectly, it would seem) as a labor lock-out (paro obrero). 
90 It has been contended, without adoption by the Supreme Court, that, notwith· 
standing the practice since the enactment of the Labor Law, Labor Boards cannot 
declare a strike "existent," but only "non-existent" or "unlawful." This is the celebrated 
"Pozo thesis," advanced by Justice Pozo, of the Labor Division of the Supreme Court. 
The argument is purely textual, that the Labor Law speaks only of the two latter forms 
of decisions, in granting authority to the Boards. De la Cueva seems to have the simple 
and perfect answer, that if the Board fails to declare a strike "non-existent" (or "unlaw-
ful"), it is in effect held "existent," whatever terminology may be employed- also that 
if a tribunal is given jurisdiction over a problem, it necessarily follows that there is 
authority to render a decision, and that it is not necessary that the law state expressly 
that the decision can be either way. In labor circles it has been felt that the "Pozo 
thesis," if adopted, would be a step backward- it is not clear to me (although compli-
cated by procedural questions) that it would have any substantial effect. "Conciliacion, 
sin Facultades Para Declarar Legal una Huelga," Mexico City Excelsior, July 7, 1949,. 
p. 1; "Conmocion, por los Debates en la Corte" and "Pardo Aspe no Acepta Lagunas 
en la Ley," both id., July 8, 1949, p. 1; "Arbitraje Obligatorio," editorial, id., July 8, 
1949, p. 6; "La Tesis de Pozo Beneficiaria Solo a los Trabajadores" and "Se Complies 
el Debate en la Corte," both id., July 9, 1949, p. 1; "Ha Sufrido Confusiones el Ministro· 
Pozo en el Asunto de las Huelgas, Dice Mario de la Cueva," id., July 10, 1949, p. 1 (De 
la Cueva quoted); "Probable Rechazo de la Tesis Pozo en la Junta de Hoy" and 
"Puntos de Vista Obreros Sobre el Debate J uridico," both id., July 11, 1949, p. 1; 
"Tras de un Enconado Debate, fue Derrotada Ayer Ia Tesis Pozo," id., July 12, 1949, 
p. 1; Lie. Victor M. Mercado, La Existencia de una Huelga, id., July 26, 1949, p. 7; 
"El Ministro Pozo Sepulto su Tesis Sobre las Huelgas," id., October 6, 1949, p. 4; 
"Abusa Ia Corte del Sobreseimiento y Niega asi Justicia, Dice un Ministro," id., August 
15, 1950, p. 4; "Otra vez se lmpuso la Tesis Pozo en la Suprema Corte de J usticia," id., 
August 17, 1950, p. 1; "Empresa Amparada Contra una Huelga," id., September I, 
1950, p. 46. 
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the substantive demands (as to wages, hours, etc.) 97 and is given 
legal protection. A !Strike failing to meet any of these require-
ments is normally not unlawful,98 but is "non-existent,"99 and is 
not given legal protection. An "existent" or "non-existent" strike 
becomes "unlawful" only when the majority of the strikers are 
guilty of acts of violence, or the strike is against the government 
in time of war.100 The purpose of the majority requirement is to 
prevent employers from causing a ruling of illegality by planting 
agents among the strikers.101 
I have stated that to be "existent" a strike must be called for a 
lawful purpose. The range of permissible purposes is so broad as 
to be almost all-inclusive.102 By the Constitution a strike may be 
called to "attain equilibrium among the various factors of pro-
duction, harmonizing the rights of labor with those of capital.moa 
This obviously can mean almost anything, and it has not been 
97 Labor Law,§ 269; 2 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, DERECHo MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d 
ed. 1949) 814, 863, 866; ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, EvoLUCION DE LA HuELGA (1950) 
263, 266, 268, 270; Amp. Sindicato de Teran de Palomeque, 54 S.J.F. 1939 (1938, deci· 
sion 1937). See also Constitution, Art. 123 (18). 
98 Under the Constitution this is necessarily true, except in the sense that under 
certain circumstances the workers may incur civil liability. 2 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, 
DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 812; ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, EVO· 
LUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 138. "Lawful," in Article 123 (18) of the Constitution, 
relates only to the purpose of the strike, whereas "existent" includes other elements. 
99 For examples of decisions of the federal Labor Board holding strikes existent 
and non-existent, respectively, see: "Resoluci6n que Declara Existente Ia Huelga de 
los Trabajadores de Ia Empresa Wells Fargo & Co.", 22 Trabajo y Prevision Social 
39 (1944, Num. 81); "Resoluci6n que Declara lnexistente la Huelga de los Traba-
jadores de 'La Perfeccionada,' Fabrica de Hilados y Boneteria," id. at 19. 
100 Constitution, Art. 123 (18), repeated in Labor Law, § 263. 
101 Deputy Jara, of the Constitutional Convention, quoted: ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, 
EvoLUci6N DE LA HuELcA (1950) 142. 
102 Constitution, Art. 123 (18); Labor Law, § 260. 
10s Art. 123 (18). 
1953] MEXICAN LABOR LAW 467 
given any restrictive interpretation.104 So any sort of demands for 
higher wages, shorter hours, fringe benefits, etc., no matter how 
extreme, constitute a lawful purpose. 
There can, however, still be an improper purpose, such as, 
tor example, a strike contrary to the provisions of a union con-
tract.105 It has also been held that the discharge by the employer 
of union officials does not justify a strike.106 Presumably it would 
not be a proper purpose to endeavor to take over the prerogatives 
of management. A Labor Board held that increases in the cost of 
living would not justify a strike, as the required disequilibrium 
had to be between the enterprise and its employees- the effect 
of this would seem to be simply to require the unions to rephrase 
their demands.107 
The Labor Law expressly authorizes sympathetic strikes in aid 
of those having lawful purposes/08 but De la Cueva109 contends 
that this provision of the Labor Law is unconstitutional.110 He 
also feels that sympathetic strikes are dangerous because tending 
104 Trueba points out that the conception of "equilibrium" has caused polemical 
battle among jurists and economists, and contradictory decisions. EvoLUCION DE LA 
HuELGA (1950) 262. He himself considers it "a just participation in the benefits." He 
feels that the lack of equilibrium may arise, not only from causes within the enterprise, 
but from outside phenomena such as the high cost of living, devaluation of the 
money, etc. 
De Ia Cueva considers "equilibrium" to be "the highest level of life [for the 
workers] compatible with the existence of the enterprise." 2 DERECHO MEXICANO DEL 
TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 836. Equilibrium is to be attained between the particular em· 
ployer and his employees, and not between capital and labor in general. 
The Supreme Court has held that "equilibrium" means betterment of the condi· 
tions of labor as the economic condition of business improves. Amp. Union Sindical 
de Peluqueros, July 20, 1935, quoted: TRUEBA, op. cit. supra at 137. 
105 2 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 870. 
1 oo Amp. "La Consolida," S.A. August 8, 1947, 30 Revista del Trabajo 26 (1947, 
Num. ll7), quoted at length: "Aplauden el Fallo de la Corte Sobre Cese de Lideres," 
Mexico City Excelsior, July 22, 1948, p. I. 
1 0 7 "No Existe la Huelga de los Textiles," Mexico City Excelsior, September 29, 
1948, p. 1, dealing with a strike of Union de Empleados y Trabajadores de Compaiifas 
Plataneras against the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company. 
108§ 260(4). 
109 2 DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 893. 
110 Under Art. 123 (18). 
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in the direction of general or revolutionary strikes.111 Trueba, on 
the other hand, believes that a sympathetic strike is not contrary 
to the Constitution, as the strike being aided "has for its object 
maintenance of equilibrium among the factors of production, and 
action of solidarity among the workers necessarily tends toward 
co-operation in the establishment of such equilibrium."112 Trueba 
holds, nevertheless, that a revolutionary strike is not legally pro-
tected, although he recognizes that a sympathetic strike might 
become so widespread as to produce the effects of a revolutionary 
strike.113 
When the Labor Law was being framed, it was argued, in favor 
of sympathetic strikes, that the government should be interested 
in developing ties of harmony and solidarity among the workers, 
in such a way as to make them understand that their problems 
are common to all and that they should unite in the better defense 
of their interests - also that the aid of their comrades would 
hasten the solution of controversies, with consequent lesser injury 
to both sides.114 
In order to he ruled "existent" a sympathetic strike has to 
comply in each enterprise with the usual requirements as to other 
strikes- majority vote, arbitration period, etc. A newspaper re-
port indicates that these requirements have practical effect in re-
straining such strikes.116 
As with us, outsiders may give the strikers financial assistance. 
111 A newspaper report stated that the electrical workers in 22 states .had threatened 
to go on strike in aid of strikers at Ciudad Guzman, Colima and Morelia. "Anuncian 
los Electricistas una Huelga en Veintidos Estados, Como un Acto de Solidaridad," 
Mexico City Excelsior, July 29, 1951, p. 1. 
112 EvoLUciON DE LA HU.ELGA (1950) 267. Accord: NICOLAS PIZARRO SuAREZ, LA 
HUELGA EN EL DERECHO MEXICANO (1938) 117. 
11s EvowciON DE LA HuELGA (1950) 268. 
114 Diario de los Debates de la Camara de Diputados del Congreso de Los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, XXXIV Legislatura, Torno II, No. 11, July 10, 1931, p. 16, quoted: 
ALBERTO TRUERA URBINA, EVOLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 267. 
115 "No Podran Efectuar Huelgas Solidarias," Mexico City Excelsior, March 19, 
1951, p. 1. 
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Not only do other unions send money, but farmers (campesinos) 
have sent corn and beans.116 
A newspaper editorial states that in Monterrey, the industrial 
capital of Mexico, where there have been many bitter struggles in 
the steel mills, capital-labor relations have been substantially im-
proved through a system whereby councils elected by the workers 
impose penalties upon workers who fail to do their duty.117 
I have stated that when the Labor Board has "quali:fied"a strike 
as "existent," it is given legal protection. This means that the 
employer is prohibited from hiring strikebreakers (popularly 
termed "esquiroles"), 118 and that any minority workers who have 
voted against the strike are not permitted to continue working.119 
In other words, there is no possibility of the employer's continuing 
to do business. Trueba says that this means that the outcome of 
the strike will be determined by the "free play" of the parties, as 
there will be no possibility of the strike's being settled otherwise 
than by agreement between them.120 We may be permitted to wonder 
whether the employer would consider the play "free." The Labor 
Law also provide~ that if the causes of such a strike are imputable 
to the employer (which, again, could mean almost anything) he 
shall pay the wages lost during the strike.121 This provision, how-
ever, is not effective, since what, if anything, shall be done about 
wages lost will be worked out as part of the strike settlement.122 
116 "Ayudanin a Huelgistas," Mexico City Excelsior, July 6, 1951, p. SA; "Graves 
Escollos Para Resolver el Conflicto Minero de Palau," id., October 3, 1950, p. 1. 
117 "Participacion de Utilidades," Mexico City Excelsior, December 15, 1950, 
p. 6. 
118 Labor Law, §§ 8, 274. Any strikers who may regret their action and desire to 
return to work during the progress of the strike are included within the prohibition. 
Strikebreakers cannot be employed during the period within which the union is taking 
the steps required by law in order to get a strike lawfully under way. Amp. Sind. de 
Trab. de Volante y Sim. de Monterrey, C.T.M., 67 S.J.F. 3314 (1941). 
uo Labor Law, § 8(2); 2 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO 
(3d ed. 1949) 864, 866. See also § 272 of the Law. 
120 EVOLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 281. 
121 Labor Law, § 271. See 2 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO 
(3d ed. 1949) 816; ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, EvoLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 271. 
1 22 For example, in a strike which had lasted over a month, the two points remain· 
ing for discussion were the wages lost and the hours of work. "El Conflicto de 'El 
Porvenir,'" Mexico City Excelsior, August 1, 1951, p. 4A. 
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If the strike is qualified as "non-existent," it is without legal 
protection, and the employer is free to hire other workers, the 
Labor Board taking whatever protective steps are necessary in 
order to make continuance of work possible.123 The strikers may 
also be subject to civil liability (no doubt worthless to the em-
ployer) / 24 but apart from this they are still privileged to cease 
work, under the guaranties set forth in the Fifth Article of the 
Constitution. Non-employees are prohibited from participating in 
a "non-existent" or "unlawful" strike.125 
If the strike is qualified as "unlawful," the only clear differ-
ence (as compared with being ruled "non-existent") is the cer-
tainty that there will be guilty workers subject to penalliability.126 
It is an unsettled point, upon which the jurists differ, as to whether 
the labor contracts of the innocent minority of the workers (the 
unlawfulness arising out of acts of violence by the majority) shall 
be canceled. De la Cueva holds that they are to be, "as a conse-
quence of the strike's being the action of a workers' coalition, and 
not, as formerly considered, the juxtaposition of individual 
acts.m27 Trueba, however, while agreeing that a strike is not a 
group of individual acts, feels that "it is absurd to punish with 
the loss of his work one who has committed no fault or infraction 
in the exercise of his rights."~28 Incidentally, any violation of the 
Labor Law calls for at least the imposition of a small fine.129 
It will be observed that the strikers may win a "non-existent" 
123 Labor Law, § 269 (3, 4) ; 2 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL 
TRABAJo (3d ed. 1949) 870. 
124 Labor Law, § 269(3). 
125Labor Law,§ 269bis(b). 
126 Labor Law, § 268. The provisions of Article 123 (18) of the Constitution, specify. 
ing when a strike is "unlawful," have been discussed in the text. 
1 27 2 DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed, 1949) 873. 
128 Evowci6N DE LA HuELcA (1950) 283. NICOLAS PIZARRO SuAREZ, LA HuELcA EN 
EL DERECHO MEXICANO (1938) 152, is quoted to the same effect. 
129 Labor Law, § 683. Penal aspects in general are not treated in this article. See 
ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, DERECHO PENAL DEL TRABAJO (1948). For a case in which a 
fine was imposed because of improper acts against a strike, see Amp. Rodrigues Isabel, 
65 S.J.F. 4234 (1941). 
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or "unlawful" strike; but nevertheless the desire to obtain govern-
ment support, and to influence public opinion through securing 
legal approval, is sufficient to cause regular resort to the proce-
dures of the Labor Boards, followed sometimes by an appeal 
( amparo) to the courts. There is also the factor that by instituting 
Board proceedings the union is given, during the pendency of the 
proceedings, a final opportunity to negotiate for a peaceful settle-
ment without losing face. 
During a strike (or any temporary suspension of work) the 
workers are required to leave the premises.130 The activities of 
the strikers are "limited to the mere act of suspension of work," 
and moral as well as physical coercion and violence are expressly 
prohibited, under severe penal sanction.131 These provisions neces-
sarily eliminate sit-down strikes/32 picketing and boycotts; and 
slow-downs, the "turtle's pace" (paso de tortuga),183 as a partial 
suspension of work, seem to be clearly included. The strikers are 
required to furnish the maintenance men considered necessary by 
the Labor Board, 134 and the newspapers often report the hearings 
held for this purpose. 135 In general, the famous red and black flag 
of the strikers (unfortunately coinciding with the colors of com-
munism and despair), posted at the entrance to the struck enter-
prise, seems to he sufficient to accomplish all their purposes, al-
though there are occasional newspaper reports of violence136 (in 
130 Labor Law, § 114(6). 
131 Labor Law, § 262. 
132 For detailed accounts of a sit-down strike which nevertheless occurred: "Es 
Delicada la Situaci6n de Textiles," Mexico City Excelsior, October 7, 1948, p. 1; "Los 
Trabajadores del Ramo de Lana Ofrecen no Cometer Ningun Otro Acto de Violencia," 
id., October 9, 1948, p. 1. 
133 For a complaint of such activity: "La Fundidora de Monterrey se Quej6 de 
Actos de Sabotaje," Mexico City Excelsior, March 11, 1951, p. 17. 
134 Labor Law, § 275. In case of necessity the Board is authorized to request gov-
ernmental assistance to see that other workers perform such services. 
135 For example: "Los Conflictos en Monterrey," Mexico City Excelsior, October 20, 
1950, p. 14. 
136 For example: "Una Verdadera Fusilata fue la Matanza Obrera en Santa Rosa," 
·Mexico City Excelsior, July 14, 1948, p. 1; "Los Obreros Textiles Apelan al Sabotaje 
al Perder la Huelga," id., Oct. 5, 1948, p. 13; "Asaltos a Panaderias y Cafes," id., 
Oct. 22, 1948, p. 13. 
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the long run, as with us, both sides no doubt being equally guilty). 
In dealing with the problem of strikes, which is basically psy-
chological, it is difficult to extract anything of value from statistics 
-an extreme degree of effort is required in order to endeavor to 
evaluate them. To begin with, in Mexico, in any such attempt upon 
a national basis, it must be remembered that a large percentage of 
the population consists of Indians whose contact with civilization 
is almost non-existent - President Aleman stated that it is one of 
Mexico's greatest problems how to make them a part of its civil-
ization. An area which has since been improved was thus de-
scribed: 
Of nearly a million people in the area in 1947, only two in ten owned 
shoes, only three in ten could read and write. The typical home was 
a bamboo hovel. The average life span in some places was only 29 
years. 
* * * * * 
Three years ago Sayula [a village] ... lived much as it had three 
centuries back. Four out of five families in the wattled, floorless 
huts spoke only an Indian dialect_l37 
Statistics covering every phase of labor law are published by 
the government in great detaiP38 During a 1949-1950 12-month 
period 8,325 matters of every sort, union and individual, were 
initiated before the Federal Labor Board (Junta Federal de Con-
ciliaci6n y Arbitraje) .139 Some 9,681 were concluded, and at the 
close of the year 16,094 were pending. There were 504 strike 
notices, four strikes qualified as "existent" settled by agreement, 
one "existent" strike discontinued, eleven strikes declared "non-
existent," 135 strikes not qualified settled by agreement, 159 
187 A New Day in Butterfly Basin, condensed by Ruth Watt Mulvey from La Prensa, 
New York, 59 Reader's Digest 129 (August, 1951), used by permission of the Reader's 
Digest. See also TANNENBAUM, MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND BnEAD (1950) 
173 ff. 
188 The statistics in the text are taken from the 1950 MEMORIA DE LABORES, SEc-
RET ARIA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISION SociAL, at pp. 179 ff. 
18D In general, the federal Board has jurisdiction over all matters arising in the 
City of Mexico (the Federal District, to be exact) and the federal territories, and all 
important businesses throughout the country. 2 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO 
DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) c. LXXX, p. 961. 
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:strikes not qualified discontinued, and 723 union contracts de-
posited. 65,488 items of correspondence (presumably largely 
pleadings, depositions and reports) were received, and 8,196 dis-
patched. The pecuniary amount of judgments was 3, 773,928.85 
pesos. 
Trueba declares enthusiastically that the statistics set forth in 
'"the pages of books and official publications reveal the dynamic 
progress of the strike."140 This is, of course, a highly subjective ap-
praisal by a brilliant jurist who is also a political leader and a 
union attorney. Trueba presents figures showing how wages have 
increased141 - this leads into another field of difficulties in regard 
to evaluation, as such figures need to he evaluated in the light of 
the declining purchasing power of the peso. 
During the summer of 1948 I visited the scenes of two strikes 
which happened to be in progress while I was in Mexico City. 
Each had lasted four months. Each was against a local employer, 
·one a building contractor, the other an eating-place concessionaire 
in a leading hotel. The struck enterprises were idle, with the red 
.and black flag displayed. At what would have been quitting time 
the construction workers gathered in the street beside the half-
·constructed building and answered a roll call by a union represen-
tative. I talked with the workers, and they gave no manifestation 
.of intense feelings. 
At the same time a Pullman strike, occasioned by the laying-off 
·of 32 workers on the Southern Pacific, was causing losses of mil-
lions of pesos to the hotels alone.142 The strike was settled, and 
the red and black flags removed from the idle cars, when the 
Under Secretary of Labor induced both sides to agree to abide by 
the decision of the Labor Board, which had been very dilatory in 
:its proceedings. 
140 Evowc16N DE LA HuELGA (1950) 303. 
141/d. at 263. 
142 Among many news reports: "Cinco Millones han Perdido ya los Hoteleros,'' Mex· 
ico City Excelsior, July 2 ,1948, p. 1. 
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The same summer Mexico lost fifty million pesos in three 
months because of a strike of zinc and lead miners, and prices of 
those metals reached higher points in New York than they had 
during the war.143 During the same year, there were, among 
others, great iron and steel strikes, 144 a national strike in the 
woolen mills,146 an electrical strike in Monterrey,146 and a bakers' 
strike which was settled upon the initiative of the President.147 
In 1949 a bus line was paralyzed by a strike for seven 
months.148 In 1950 troops took over for a time operation of the 
railroad telegraphic services, 149 and there was a 72-day strike of 
5,000 miners.160 In two years there were six telephone strikes.161 
During the first third of 1951 a "hunger march" of striking 
miners proceeded, amidst a welter of charges, including one of 
143 
"Mexico Perdio 50 Millones por una Huelga," Mexico City Excelsior, July 29, 
1948, p. 1. 
144 Fundi dora strike: "Parece Eternizarse el Caso de la Fundidora," Mexico City 
Universal, Aug. 12, 1948, p. 1; "AI fin Cesa la Huelga en la Fundidora, que Causo 
Perdidas por 32 Millones," Mexico City Excelsior, Sept. 25, 1948, p. 1. Fierro y Acero 
de Monterrey strike: "Dos Puntos Basicos Detienen la Solucion de un Conflicto," id., 
Aug. 31, 1948, p. 1. 
145 "Estallo la Huelga General en las Fabricas de Hilados y Tejidos," Mexico City 
Excelsior, Sept. 25, 1948, p. 1. 
146 
"Continua la Huelga en Monterrey, N. L.," Mexico City Excelsior, Oct. 20, 1948, 
p.l. 
147 
"Anoche Se Reanudo la Elaboracion de pan en la Metropoli," Mexico City 
Excelsior, Oct. 22, 1948, p. 1. 
148 
"Siete Meses de Huelga," Mexico City Excelsior, Nov. 23, 1949, p. 4. 
149 "Conserva el Ejercito el Control Telegrafico de los Ferrocarriles," Mexico City 
Excelsior, Dec. 13, 1950, p. 1. 
150 "Angustiosa Situacion por la Huelga en Fresnillo," Mexico City Excelsior, April 
9, 1950, p. 5. 
151 A single reference for each strike: "Un Amparo Determino Ayer que Siga la 
Huelga Telefonica," Mexico City Excelsior, Mar. 6, 1949, p. 1; "Solamente 40 Minutos 
Duro Ayer la Huelga de los Telefonos de Mexico," id., Jan. 19,1950, p. 1; "Sin Variacion 
Alguna Continua la Huelga de los Telefonistas," id., Mar. 3, 1950, p. 1; "A las 3 Horas 
Termino hoy la Huelga de Telefonistas," id., Aug. 4, 1950; "El Gobierno se lncauto de 
los Telefonos y Acabo la Huelga," id., Nov. 22; 1950, p. 1; "La Huelga de Telefonistas." 
id., Feb. 5, 1951, p. 11. 
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communist influence, to Mexico City.152 Odd-numbered years are 
normally relatively peaceful, as most of the large union contracts 
are made during even-numbered years for a two-year period.153 
5. LocKouTs 
While the right of employers to effect what are termed lockouts 
(paros) is expressly recognized by the Constitution, 154 along with 
the right of workers to strike, it is further provided that lockouts 
are lawful only when made necessary by excess of production, in 
order to maintain prices upon a basis which will cover costs.155 
Lockouts in the sense that we use the term are therefore pro-
hibited;156 and price-fixing practices are outside the scope of this 
article. Of course, an intransigent employer can accomplish the 
same result as a lockout by precipitating the calling of a strike 
by the union. 
De la Cueva explains the apparent unfairness of the law in 
permitting strikes but not lockouts by arguing that "the strike is 
the struggle of man, in defense of his rights, against things, and 
that the lockout is the struggle of things against man," again, that 
"the law of labor tends to resolve a human problem, and not to 
152 Baltasar Dromundo, La verdad sobre La "Caravana del Hambre," 17 La Justicia 
10898 (1951); "Caravana de Hambre de 6,000 Obreros," Mexico City Excelsior, Jan 21, 
1951, p. 1; "La Caravana de los Mineros se Encuentra en las Goteras de la Ciudad de 
Mexico," id., Mar. 9, 1951, p. 15; "En la Basilica, los Min eros Prescindieron de su Ban· 
dera Comunista," id., Mar. 12, 1951, p. 13; "Aleman Comisiona a Ruiz Cortines Para 
que Resuelva el Conflicto Minero de Nueva Rosita," id., Mar. 13, 1951, p. 1; "Mas de 
un Millon de Pesos Recaudados por los Lideres de la Caravana, Segun un Viejo Minero," 
id., Mar. 15, 1951, p. 17; "Solo Ayuda de Alimentos a los que lntegran la Caravana 
Minera," id., Mar. 20, 1951, p. 1; "Los Comunistas Azuzan a los Mineros, a fin de 
Utilizarlos Como lnstrumento de Agitacion," id., Mar. 23 ,1951, p. 1; "Deserciones de 
Mineros de la Caravana," id., Mar. 25, 1951, p. 9; "Golpean a los Mineros que ya no 
Quieren a la Caravana," id., Mar. 27, 1951, p. 13; "Apoyo a la Caravana," id., Apr. 3, 
1951, p. 14; "1,800 Mineros han Sido Reocupados, en Coahuila," id., May 8, 1951, p. 1. 
153 "1951 Promete ser un aiio Pacifico en Materia Obrera," Mexico City Excelsior, 
Jan. 1, 1951, p. 4. 
154 Art. 123 (17). Prior approval by the Labor Board is required. See Labor Law, §§ 
116(3), 118-120, 277-283, 680 (may be punished by fine as high as 2,000 pesos). 
155 Constitution, Art. 123 (19). 
156 A brewery moving to another city without Labor Board permission was held 
guilty of an unlawful lockout. It was ordered to resume operations at its old location 
and pay all wages lost, and was fined 2,000 pesos. Amp. Cia. Cerveceria Sabinas, S.A., 
46 S.J.F. 1413 (1937, decision 1935). 
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defend the supposed rights of things.m57 The fallacy of such rea-
soning is sufficiently obvious. 
A newspaper report states that the Mexican motion picture 
producers tacitly declared "a strike of 'fallen arms' " (brazos 
caidos) because of differences with a union.158 
"Lockout" (paro) is sometimes used in the secondary, if not 
incorrect, sense of a strike which has not been "qualified,"159 pos-
sibly one not expected ever to be qualified.160 
6. UNIONS161 
The right to form unions is guaranteed by the famous Article 
123 of the Constitution.162 In 1950 there were 434,565 workers 
organized in 1, 712 unions.163 The same term, sindicatos, is used 
to describe both employers' and workers' organizations. 
The "closed shop" is permitted,164 and the exclusion clause di-
rected against non-union workers has caused many disputes.165 In 
applying the clause to compel the discharge of a worker, he is 
157 2 DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABA.JO (3d ed. 1949) 888. See ALBERTO TRUEBA 
URBINA, EVOLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 136, 223. 
158 
"Huelga de Brazos Caidos de los Productores de Cine," Mexico City Excelsior, 
Sept. 9, 1950, p. l. 
159 A strike not qualified was thus described by a Mexican attorney with whom I 
conferred. Wildcat strikes because of intra-union struggle have been thus referred to: 
"Hubo Paros en Cananea, Son.", Mexico City Excelsior, Sept. 9, 1950, p. 13. 
160 "Ceso a Mil de sus Trabajadores la Compaiiia de Palau," Mexico City Excelsior, 
Sept. 30, 1950, p. l. 
161 See, in general, Labor Law,§§ 232-257; 2 MARIO DE LA CuEvA, DERECHO MEXICANO 
DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 285 If. The various kinds of unions provided for in the law, 
together with some of the provisions governing them, are set forth in Cormack & Barker, 
The Mexican Labor Law, 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 251,279 (1934). The history of the princi-
pal unions is presented in CLARK, ORGANIZED LABOR IN MEXICO (1934). 
162 In Subdivision 16. 
163 1950 MEMORIA DE LABORES, SECRETARIA DEL TRABAJO y PREVISION SociAL, chart 
preceding Anexo Num. 4. 
164 Labor Law, §§ 49, 236. It may not, however, operate to the prejudice of workers 
already employed who become parties to the contract. § 49; Amp. Pinero Hermanos, 
S.de R. L. [Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada], Feb. 21, 1947, 30 Revista del 
Trabajo 31 (1947, Nums. 108-113). 
The constitutionality of the Labor Law provisions for the closed shop is examined at 
length in 2 MARIO D.E LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 392. 
See also id. at 382, 404, 667. 
165 For example, Amp. Corona Diaz Julian y coags., 103 S.J.F. 1232 (1950). 
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entitled to due process of law- notification of charges, etc.166 
Employers are required by the Labor Law to give preference to 
union members when hiring workers.167 A union contract applies 
to all non-union employees.168 The "check-off" is required of the 
employer, when expressly agreed to by the union member in ad-
vance.169 The government is encouraging workers of different 
trades to come together in unions.170 
The unions complain of company "white" unions, 171 and both 
employers and the established unions complain of wildcat 
("locas", literally crazy) strikes,172 sometimes declared by 
"straw" unions existing only on paper and used by racketeers to 
extort payments from employers.173 
As with us, there are jurisdictionaP74 and intra-union17i con-
troversies. Trueba refers to the triumph of the right to strike, not-
withstanding hot-headed acts of strikebreakers and employers and 
proletarian bloodshed from jurisdictional struggles.176 
166 Amp. Perez Ramon H., "Los Lideres no Pueden Cesar a los Trabajadores," Mex-
ico City Excelsior, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 4. 
167 § 111(1). 
168 Labor Law, § 48. Except, of course, those of higher rank. 
169 Labor Law, §§ 91, Ill (19, 20). 
1 70 "Fortalecimiento de Varios Sindicatos," Mexico City Excelsior, Apr. 7, 1950, p. 3. 
171 "Combatinin a Los Sindicatos Blancos," Mexico City Excelsior, May 30, 1949, p. 4. 
1 72 Among many reports: "Cam peon de las Huelgas Locas," Mexico City Excelsior, 
Mar. 28, 1948, p. 30; "Amenazan con Huelgas Locas," id., Mar. 24, 1949, p. 36; "Esta 
en Puerta Otra Huelga Loca Minera," id., Oct. 4, 1950, p. 1; "Han Disminuido Con-
siderablemente las Huelgas Locas," id., Mar. 6, 1951, p. 4. 
178 Among many reports: "Amilpa Seiiala el Remedio Para Evitar Huelgas Locas," 
Mexico City Excelsior, Mar. 14, 1949, p. 1; "Se Pondra fin a la Anarquia en las 
Demandas Obreras," id., Apr. 4, 1949, p. 1; "Existen mas de 1,500 Sindicatos," id., Mar. 
3, 1951, p. 9; "Revision de los Registros de Varios Sindicatos," id., Mar. 28, 1951, p. 4. 
174 Among many reports: "2 Sindicatos Piden Amparo Contra la Sria. del Trabajo," 
Mexico City Excelsior, Aug. 15, 1950, p. 4; "Probablemente Surje Otra Nueva Central," 
id., Aug. 16,1950, p. 1; "Huelga por un Conflicto lntergremial," id., Oct. 17, 1950, p. 1; 
"Numerosas Plantas Estan a Punto de Clausurarse," id., May 23, 1951, p. 15A. 
175 Among many reports: "No Hay Division en los Mineros," Mexico City Excelsior, 
Aug. 17, 1950, p. 10. 
176 Evowc16N DE LA HuELGA 0950) 303. 
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7. LABOR BoARDs 
With the Mexicans, as with us, I feel that the real value of the 
boards is that they give a skilled negotiator a chance to work pri-
vately with the parties and induce them to make concessions, with-
out "losing face," which they would not otherwise yield, and thus 
to come to an agreement. Just as peace is less spectacular than 
war, so the achievements of the boards are less spectacular than 
strikes; but they are nonetheless substantial. Requiring the parties 
by law to participate in the proceedings before the boards is part 
of the technique which prevents them from "losing face". 
There are two kinds of boards: Conciliation; and Conciliation 
and Arbitration. The former are limited to endeavoring to effect 
an amicable adjustment. The latter have the additional, and pos-
sibly primary, function of making a complete record and "quali-
fying" a strike. 
Each board is composed of three177 members. A public member, 
appointed by the government, acts as President. The others repre-
sent, respectively, and are elected by, the employers and the 
unions.178 It can readily be appreciated that the representatives of 
capital and labor tend to line up against each other upon all ques-
tions of policy, 179 leaving the decisive responsibility with the 
President - while I was talking to the President and one of the 
other members of a board, the latter pointed to the President, and 
said, without contradiction, "He is the board." Likewise, a Mexi-
can attorney has written that in effect the board is composed of 
one member/80 but this is hardly a fair statement, as the other 
members make a contribution - the acts of the President would 
not carry nearly as much weight if the others were not present. 
1 77 Except where more than one industry is involved. 
178 Constitution, Art. 123(20); Labor Law,§§ 336,345,354,362. 
179 However, a strike was unanimously "qualified" as "non·existent" when declared 
while a union contract was in force: "La Huelga de Subalternos," Mexico City Excelsior, 
Jan. 20, 1951, p. 4. 
180 Felipe Ibarra Olivares, ;,Por que se Fund6 la Junta Federal de Conciliaci6n v 
Arbitraje?, 31 Revista del Trabajo 7, 11 (1948, Num. 121). 
1953] MEXICAN LABOR LAW 479 
The ordinary proceedings before the boards are considered 
"juridic" - ascertaining the rights of the parties under existing 
contracts and legal provisions, including those in regard to how 
to promote or oppose strikes. Distinguished from these are col-
lective "economic" conflicts- to determine what rights should be 
established. A special procedure is provided for the "economic" 
conflicts, including the appointment of experts who make a report 
to the board.181 The "economic" conflicts are usually more general 
in character, often involving general economic conditions.182 In 
the "economic" conflicts the board goes into the substantive merits 
of the demands and defenses of the parties, not being limited, as 
with strikes, to questions of purposes and taking the proper steps. 
The Supreme Court has thus described the two types of contro-
versies: 
Conflicts between capital and labor have a double nature, since they 
can be of a juridical character or of an economic nature; the former 
is the case when the question being contested relates to the obligations 
existing between the parties and when, consequently, what is being 
asked is compliance with obligations assumed in contracts or derived 
from existing law; and the latter when the workers or the employers 
feel that the contractual standards governing the rendition of services 
do not correspond to the necessities of the workers or the actual condi-
tion of the industry; and then, as has been indicated, what is asked is 
the equitable and just distribution of the part of the product which 
should belong to each .... 183 
During a 1949-1950 12-month period the Federal Board of 
Conciliation and Arbitration dealt with 124 "economic" con-
flicts.184 The majority were occasioned by reduction in electric 
power (the result of prolonged drouth) or lack of raw materials, 
181 Labor Law, §§ 570 If.; 3 ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, DERECHO PROCESAL DEL TRA-
BAJO (1943) 115. 
182 Rodolfo Cepeda Villareal, Concepto y Clasificacion de los Conflictos de Trabajo, 6 
EI Foro 10, 27 (1949, Niim. I); 2 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO 
(3d ed. 1949) 772. 
183 Amp. Compafiia de Petroleo "EI Aguila," 55 S.J.F. 2007, 2081 (1939, decision 
1938) ~ 
184 1950 MEMORIA DE LABORES, SECRETARiA DEL TRABAJO v PREVISION SociAL, p. 183. 
480 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7 
necessitating temporary closures or reduction in the number of 
hours worked. One conflict related to cutting down the number 
of street cars in Tampico. 
In general it is the duty of the boards, in addition to dealing 
with strikes, to supervise the necessary technologicaF86 and other 
changes in businesses, and lessen the resulting hardships to work-
ers.186 The boards also endeavor to see that inequities do not arise 
among workers, and that changes in businesses are not used as 
subterfuges to evade obligations under the Labor Law.187 In one 
case the board, without waiting to go into the merits, permitted 
the immediate closing of a business for 90 days upon posting a 
bond in the amount of 1,300,000 pesos to cover wage claims in 
the event the suspension was found not to have been justified.188 
As I pointed out in discussing the discharge of workers, there 
is no absolute compulsion to resort to or obey the boards in con-
nection with either juridic or economic matters, but nevertheless 
the pressure is great enough to cause the parties, normally, at least 
to go through the procedures before the boards. For example, 
small enterprises may desire to reduce personnel and to lower 
wages.189 In a famous "economic" case it was decided that the old 
mills manufacturing the corn meal "mass" for the staff-of-life 
tortillas should yield to modern plants making more extensive 
185 "Agitan Contra Ia Modernizaci6n," Mexico City Excelsior, Feb. 24, 1949, p. 23; 
"Arbitros en el Conflicto Textil," id., Sept. 22, 1949, p. 1; "Convenio Sobre Ia Modern-
izaci6n Textil," id., July 12, 1950, p. 1; "Tardani Todavia Ia Modernizaci6n Textil," id., 
Sept. 11, 1950, p. 1; "Indemnizaci6n a los Trabajadores Desplazados por Ia Moderniza-
ci6n," id., Nov. 11, 1950, p. 4; "Desde hoy Rige el Pacto Sobre Ia Modernizaci6n de los 
Hilados," id., Jan. 25, 1951, p. l. 
186 Labor Law, §§ 116 ff. 
187 Amp. Caleras Beltran, S.A., 79 S.J.F. 315 (1944) (when physical conditions are 
alleged as reason for suspension of work, vis major must be proved) ; "Fabrica que se 
Clausur6," Mexico City Excelsior, Sept. 1, 1950, p. 40 (charged that factory which 
closed because of alleged lack of raw materials was really being moved to another city) ; 
"Conflicto en 'La Carpeta'," id., Oct. 26, 1950, p. 32 (charged by Trueba as attorney that 
the closing of a printing establishment was really a maneuver to open another plant and 
get rid of employees, some with forty years of service, without giving them their legal 
indemnity) . 
188 "Un Conflicto Econ6mico," Mexico City Excelsior, Dec. 27, 1950, p. 25; "No Han 
Dado aun Ia Fianza," id., Dec. 29, 1950, p. 4. Under Labor Law, § 581. 
189 "Empresas que han Pedido Reajustes," Mexico City Excelsior, Feb. 4, 1950, p. 22. 
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use of mechanical processes.190 Trueba as professor cited to his 
class, as an illustration of a "juridic" conflict, a case in which 
three "widows" of a deceased worker appeared to claim the re-
sulting workmen's compensation benefits. Additional statistics as 
to the work of the boards have been presented in connection with 
the discussion of strikes. 
The Conciliation and Arbitration Board which I visited in 
Mexico City was a busy hive of activity, contradicting a published 
report of dilatoriness and disorder twenty years ago.191 At first 
glance I did not realize that I was in the room where the proceed-
ings were being conducted. I found myself back of a waist-high 
railing extending the length of the room about four feet from the 
wall. The rest of the room was filled with typewriter tables at 
which girls were busily working. Groups of three, four or half 
a dozen men (the representatives of the employers and the unions, 
and their attorneys) were leaning over the railing and talking 
either to typists or to men inside (the members of the Board). 
Sometimes there were most animated discussions before the girls 
were told what to write (girls farther from the railing, I assumed, 
were copying depositions, pleadings, board opinions, etc.). The 
records in the cases, which the girls by the railing were prepar-
ing, were most voluminous when completed. The opposing attor-
neys seemed to cooperate in preparing the records until a dispute 
arose, when board members would be called in to settle it. There 
was no idling or small talk. While no tempers seemed to be 
aroused, the rather hectic atmosphere did not seem to me to be 
conducive to conciliation- presumably the efforts in that direc-
tion had largely been concluded, and the attorneys were then en-
gaged in preparing the records to support the "qualifications" of 
strikes, and to form the bases of possible appeals ( amparos) to 
the courts (limited, as with us, to questions of law). I went over 
190 Amp. Sind. de Obreros de Molinos de Nixtamal de lrapuato, 71 S.J.F. 3415, 3418 
(1942). 
191 Editorial, Mexico City Universal, Sept. 11, 1931, quoted, CLARK, ORGANIZED LABOR 
IN MEXICO (1934) 255. 
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one of the records with the President, and it would have made a 
favorable impression in any of our appellate courts. It seemed to 
me that, as with us, there was undue emphasis upon beautiful and 
elaborate paper work. 
The various forms of business activities are divided among the 
numerous hoards sitting in Mexico City - thus each board han-
dles only cases in fields in which it is already acquainted with the 
general conditions. 
8. UNION CONTRACTs192 
With the prevalence of union contracts many legal provisions in 
regard to terms of employment have ceased to have significance. 
The increasingly wide scope of .such agreements is evidence of the 
tendency throughout the world, which others have pointed out, to 
return to a regime of status, such as constituted the legal system 
of the Middle Ages, employment being now substituted for land 
tenure. The Mexican legal mind makes a curious theoretical recog-
nition of this, in considering the worker who has acquired rights 
under an individual or union employment contract a "third party" 
to such agreement.193 
As with us, the "fringe benefits" in union contracts are becom-
ing increasingly important as compared with the specification of 
the rate of pay. Apart from workmen's compensation, the follow-
ing fringe benefits have been noted: 
Civic center space (rural) 
Cooperatives (selling below costs plus expenses) 
Funerals 
Houses (at low rentals) 
Illness benefits 
192 Constitution, Arts. 5, 123 (1.15, 22-31) ; Labor Law, §§ 14-128; 2 MARIO DE LA 
CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 481-732, 847-853; ALBERTO 
SIDAOUI, TEORIA GENERAL DE LAS 0BLIGACIONES EN EL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO (1946). 
193 Labor Law, §§ 6, 7; consult Cormack & Barker, The Mexican Labor Law, 7 So. 
Calif. L. Rev. (1934) 251, 262. 
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Life insurance 




Premiums for punctuality 
Profits (participation in) 
Raw materials (quality of, to facilitate competition 
abroad) 
Savings funds {to be paid to worker at end of year, or 
upon leaving employment) 
Scholarships 
Schools (rural) 




Stores (selling at cost) 
Sunday closing 
Vacations 
An employers' organization (Confederaci6n Patronal) has 
placed its seal of approval upon fringe benefits, by taking the posi-
tion that in framing union contracts betterment of social services 
and the assumption of other obligations by the employer are pref-
erable to increasing the amount of wages.194 
No attempt has been made in union contracts to tie wages to 
the cost of living through a sliding scale,195 but at least one con-
tract has provided for increases depending upon the amount of 
prod~tioo.195 • 
1 94 "Mejoria Social en vez de Mayor Salario," Mexico City Excelsior, June 3 ,1951, 
p.l. 
193 Written as of the summer of 1948. 
196 1950 MEMORIA DE LABORES, LA SECRET ARIA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISION SociAL, 
p. 183, discussing contract of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de Ia Industria Azucarera 
y Similares de Ia R. M. [Republica Mexicana] with all the sugar, alcohol and similar 
industries of the country. · 
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The Labor Law provides for possible revision of union con· 
tracts at the expiration of two years/97 and it is customary to take 
advantage of this. A Labor Department official stated that he felt 
that the practice of biennial revisions is harmful, and should be 
discontinued- sometimes unnecessary trouble is caused by re-
vision, and sometimes, on the other hand, with the cost of living 
rapidly advancing, two years is too long for the workers to wait.198 
In addition to the minimum wage provisions, the Constitution 
states that all wages provided for in contracts must be "remunera-
tive" ( remunerador), to be enforced by the Labor Boards.199 It 
has apparently been assumed that this provision could not be 
brought into play during the life of a contract to permit showing 
that increases in the cost of living have caused wages (which were 
originally sufficient) to become "unremunerative". 
When a union contract has been entered into by two-thirds of 
the employers and workers in an industry in a district,200 the 
President may make it binding upon the remainder.201 It is then 
often referred to as an obligatory contract or a "contract-law" 
( contrato-ley) .202 
197 Labor Law, §§ 56, 64..66. A seemingly invalid attempt to evade this provision was 
made by simultaneously executing two contracts taking effect consecutively, the first 
for nine months and the second for two years. "Mundo Obrero- Extraordinario," Mex-
ico City Excelsior, July 26, 1948, p. 4. 
198 For the views of a columnist on contract revisions: Bernardo Ponce, Perspectiva, 
Mexico City Excelsior, Feb. 21, 1949, p. 6. 
199 Art. 123 (27b). The board may fix a scale of "remunerative" wages higher than 
the general minimum wage. Amp. Cia. Electrica y Telefonica Fronteriza, S.A., 67 S.J.F. 
3543 (1941). 
200 The "district" may be the entire country. 
201 Constitution, Art. 123(31); Labor Law,§§ 58-67; Ley Sobre Contratos Colectivos 
de Trabajo de Canicter Obligatorio, June 6, 1945. For an example of such a decree: 
"Decreto que Establece Ia Obligatoriedad del Contrato Colectivo de Ia Industria Azu-
carera, Alcoholera y Similares de la Republica Mexicana," 19 Trabajo y Prevision Social 
19 (1944, Num. 2). 
'
202 In general: Cormack & Barker, The Mexican Labor Law, 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 251, 
264 (1934); 2 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 
703-729; 3 ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, DEBEGHO PROCESAL DEL TRABAJO (1943) 307-364. 
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9. CoRRUPTION203 
Every Mexican with whom I talked, whether his sympathies 
were with capital or with labor, agreed that the governmental sys· 
tern set up to deal with labor troubles is permeated with corrup-
tion.204 None ventured an opinion as to whether this tipped the 
scales of justice in either direction (although Miss Clark reported 
in 1934 that the employers had the advantage205 ), or was just 
an added expense to both parties. 
Trueba, whose works have been frequently referred to herein, 
told his class at the law school of the University of Mexico of the 
professional witnesses (mostly lawyers) to be found at the doors 
of the boards- "three or four pesos for a lie." He spoke of one 
case in which two police officers testified as to the arrival and 
departure of workers at the scene of a disturbance, when it de-
veloped that they had been in jail at the time. He stated that false 
witnesses before the boards were never punished, and that conse-
quently there was a parade of them. 
10. CoMMUNIST INFLUENCE 
There are the same sort of reports as in this country of com-
munist influence among the unions - when we recall that with us 
Robert A. Taft has been called a communist because of his advo-
cacy of public housing, we realize how cautious a foreigner should 
be in evaluating such reports.206 At the same time, it seems clear 
that the numerous reports over many years, including statements 
2oa In general: TANNENBAUM, MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND BREAD (1950) 
79; also 69,99. 
204 An editorial: "Regeneracion Necesaria," Mexico City Excelsior, July 4, 1949, p. 
6; a letter to the editor, purporting to be from an attorney: "Exhibe las Lacras de Con-
ciliacion y Arbitraje," id., Aug. 17, 1951, p. 7A. 
205 ORGANIZED LABOR IN MEXICO (1934) 253, 259; see also id. at 113, 144, 221, 240. 
2oa Among many: CLARK, ORGANIZED LABOR IN MEXICO (1934) 78, ll5, 134, 170, 264, 
287, 289; "Maniobras Rojas en la Huelga de la Cia. Fundidora," Mexico City Excelsior, 
Aug. 18, 1948, p. 1; "Consigna a las Celulas Comunistas Para Dividir a las Centrales 
Obreras," id., July 5, 1949, p. 1; "Oposicion Obrera ala Nueva Central," id., July 10, 
1949, p. 1; "72 Millones de Obreros, Contra los Monopolios," id., July 20, 1949, p. 1. 
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purportedly issued by the Communist Party of Mexico,207 have 
some foundation; and in particular I feel that when unions take 
action upon the ground of internal communist activities,208 they 
are not usually merely satisfying personal grudges. 
If I had to hazard a guess, I would say that in Mexico the com-
munist influence is greater than with us, because of the general 
orientation of the country farther to the left. While bearing in 
mind that socialism is not communism, possibly one item which 
I observed in 1939 will serve to illustrate my point, as to the gen-
eral picture. Upon an extensive arch over the only entrance to the 
largest public school in Mexico was displayed in big letters the 
slogan, "The purpose of education is the creation of a socialist 
classless society. mo9 
During the summer of 1948 the communists apparently made 
use of a public demonstration in the heart of Mexico City (de-
clared to be against speculators and monopolists enriching them-
selves at the expense of the misery of the people) to test out 
their strength. The results were, from the standpoint of the com-
munists, very disappointing. 
11. INFLATION 
As with us, if there were no other reason, the decline in the 
value of the peso would be sufficient to keep up a constant ferment 
of labor difficulties. It has been estimated that from 1939 to 1945, 
notwithstanding the extensive wage increases· granted, the real 
value of the workers' income declined 16 per cent.210 "Carestia," 
2o1 "Declarase Enemigo del Sabotaje el Partido Comunista," Mexico City Excelsior, 
July 24, 1949, p. 1. 
2os "Burocratas Contra los Comunistas," Mexico City Excelsior, July 21, 1949, p. 27; 
"La Labor de Divisionistas," id., Aug. 16, 1950, p. 22; "Expulsion de los Comunistas en 
el Sindicato Minero," id., Sept. 29, 1950, p. 1; "Ayer Comenza la Purga de Rojos en los 
Grandes Sindicatos de Mexico," id., Feb. 22, 1951, p. 1. 
209 Going farther along the same line: NoRTHROP, THE MEETING oF EAsT AND WEST 
(1947) 50, 51. 
210 TANNENBAUM, MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND BREAD (1950) 221. The 
figure (16.4 per cent, to be exact) relates to Mexico City, where the inflationary pressure 
has probably been higher than in many smaller places. 
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the high cost of living, is a constant subject of public discussion. 
For various reasons the problem of inflation seems to be more 
poignant in Mexico than in this country, and to have been earlier 
recognized as a problem - in 1934 Miss Clark reported that 
prices had rapidly increased, greatly worsening the lot of the 
peasant.211 As a relatively undeveloped country industrially which 
needs to secure manufactured goods from abroad, the rate of ex-
change is much more important than with us, and tends to fluctuate 
madly. 
While I was in Mexico in 1948 the peso was, without warning, 
suddenly lessened in value by the government in relation to the 
dollar. The results were dramatic. Public leaders issued state-
ments that the change related only to trade with the United States, 
and should and would have no effect upon the prices in Mexico of 
Mexican products, but I knew of an instance where the price of 
Mexican silver products was marked up literally overnight to an 
extent greater than the change in the rate of exchange. Food prices 
shot up, and I saw lines of poor women having difficulty getting 
the dough for their tortillas. If the government had not acted 
quickly, taking over the sale of foodstuffs and setting up markets, 
the stability of the government would have been seriously threat-
ened. A government official confirmed my impression that the com-
munists make the most of everything of this sort in their constant 
efforts to stir up bitter feelings and create as many and as virulent 
labor troubles as possible. 
12. NATIONALISM 
I had been under the impression that there was a strong element 
of "swat the damned Yankee" in Mexican strikes (as I had found 
in Chile in 1939 was the case there). While that has been a sub-
stantial factor in the past,212 I would say that today, apart from 
211 CLARK, ORGANIZED LABOR IN MEXICO (1934) 164. 
212 /d. at 174, 275-278. It has been suggested, as an interesting speculation, that adop· 
tion of the sweeping pro-labor program embodied in the 1917 Constitution would not 
have been possible if most of the large capital of the country had not been foreign. 
TANNENBAUM, MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND BREAD (1950) 114, 115. 
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ineffective communist attempts to stir up trouble,213 it is com-
pletely non-existent. 
In fact, I was surprised to learn that now the shoe is on the 
other foot- a foreign employer is much less likely to have labor 
difficulties than a domestic one. The reason is that foreign con-
cerns generally pay much higher wages. While in Mexico City I 
learned the pay scale of the great new Sears-Roebuck department 
store (which has been successful enough to justify erection of 
additional stores of the chain in other Mexican cities), and it 
seemed to me that the people there were getting about three times 
as much as they would have received in the stores owned by local 
citizens. In the agrarian field, I was told by an American rancher, 
most of whose land had been nationalized, that the government 
had been harder upon its own citizens than upon him. 
Today the emphasis is upon getting foreign capital to develop 
their resources, notwithstanding past cries, often with justifica-
tion, about being exploited. We should remember that the present 
absence of anti-foreign feeling is in spite of what we Americans 
have to answer for in past history- for example, an American 
engineer in Mexico told me that in the "good old days," when 
labor was ground under the heel of the Diaz regime, he had seen 
213 A statement issued by the Mexican Communist Party referred to "reactionaries, 
agents of northamerican imperialism, incrusted in the government." "Declarase Enemigo 
del Sabotaje el Partido Comunista," Mexico City Excelsior, July 24, 1949, p. 1. The 
national Chambers of Commerce (Confederaci6n de Camaras de Comercio) have felt 
that there is a connection between communist influence and agitation among the workers 
employed by American concerns. "Sabotaje de Comunistas a la Cooperaci6n Inter· 
nacional," id., July 27, 1949, p. 1. Vicente Lombardo Toladano, against whom many 
charges of radicalism have been leveled over the years, and who has been at least 
accused of giving orders to communists ("Se Planea un Aumento General de Salarios," 
Mexico City Universal, Aug. 12, 1948, p. 1), is reported to have referred to a strike 
against the Ford Motor Company as "part of a great movement against northamerican 
imperialists." "Estall6 Ayer en la Ford la Primera Huelga de la Serie de Lombardo," 
Mexico City Excelsior, July 14, 1949, p. 1. Incidentally, the strike lasted only fifteen 
hours, the company having in the meantime asked the Labor Board to declare it "non-
·existent." "Inesperadamente Levant6 la Huelga en la Ford Ia UGOCM," id., July 15, 
1949, p. 1. Such a holding was later made, upon the ground that the company already 
'had in force a contract with another union. "La Huelga Contra la Ford Motor fue 
Declarada lnexistente por la Junta," id., July 23, 1949, p. 1. 
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a gang of Mexicans bossed by a giant American with a long black-
snake whip. 
It is true that the foreign individual (as distinguished from for-
eign capital) is not welcome (except as a tourist, etc.) A foreigner 
will find it extremely difficult to obtain permission to enter busi-
ness as a resident in any Latin American country, but they will 
accept him if necessary in order to get foreign capital. In Mexico 
90 per cent of the employees on the lower levels must be Mexican 
citizens,214 and in general employers are required to prefer Mexi-
cans in employment.215 No foreigner can be a member of the 
board of directors of a union.216 Under Article 33 of the Consti-
tution the President can, without trial, expel from the country any 
foreigner deemed undesirable. 
The expropriation in 1938 of the properties of the American oil 
companies, which threatened war between this country and Mexico, 
was not, as widely interpreted here, a manifestation of anti-foreign 
sentiment. It was the result of the most famous "economic" labor 
conflict of Mexican history. The government brought sufficient 
pressure to bear upon the companies to cause them to agree to 
submit their dispute over wages to an "economic" proceeding, but 
after the Supreme Court had confirmed the decision against them, 
they defied the government, resulting in the expropriation.217 
The national pride of the Mexicans, including that in their 
Indian blood, 218 and their desire to develop their own industries, 
do not require discussion. 
214 Labor Law, § 9. There are minor exceptions. 
215 Labor Law, § Ill (1). 
na Labor Law, § 240. 
217 Because of the transcendant importance of this struggle Trueba has set forth the 
text of the pleadings and the decree of expropriation in his work on labor law procedure. 
3 DERECHO PnocESAL DEL TRABA\JO (1943) 207-257. See also his Evowcu)N DE LA 
HuELCA (1950) 301. The Supreme Court wrote a 120-page opinion: Amp. Compaiifa de 
Petr6leo "El Aguila," 55 S.J.F. 2007 (1939, decision 1938). See also the earlier petroleum 
"economic" conflict: Amp. Huasteca Petroleum Co., 47 S.J.F. 5013 (1937, decision 1936). 
218 CLARK, ORGANIZED LABOR IN MEXICO (1934) 276. 
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13. ATTITUDE OF GovERNMENT 
With unions an integral part of the dominant political party, 
it would he logical to expect the Mexican government to he much 
more pro-labor than ours ever has been. Indeed, it is, from the 
standpoint of verbal utterances, and historically its interest in en-
couraging the union movement goes further hack. Volumes could 
he written upon the attitude of the government toward all the labor 
problems since 1910, hut it seems an accurate generalization to 
say that again the result is at present the same as in this country. 
Just as, with us, the unions could not have reached their pres-
ent position of strength without governmental encouragement since 
1933, so De la Cueva says that in Mexico the labor movement was . 
extraordinarily weak, and never could have met with success if 
Mexico had not recognized and guaranteed the right to strike, 
giving it a stronger legal position than it had in the United States 
or in Europe.219 
In Mexico, again as with us, while the unions have been encour-
aged, they have not been given free sway, and concepts of the 
public interest have come first. When the present Labor Law was 
being framed, for example, some of the proposals advanced by 
the employers were adopted, in place of others going farther 
in favor of labor.220 
The Supreme Court of Mexico has declared that "the labor law 
is not legislation for the benefit of the employing class, hut the 
reverse, of the working," and the laissez faire has been aban-
doned in favor of "intervention by the state as a policy which rules 
the entire life of the economic system ( colectividad) in every 
moment of its activity."221 
219 2 DERECHO l\1EXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 786. See also TANNENBAUM, 
MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND BREAD (1950) 114 If. 
22° Consult Cormack & Barker, The Mexican Labor Law, 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 251, 
256 (1934). 
221 Amp. Compaiiia de Petr6leo "El Aguila," 55 S.J.F. 2007 (1939, decision 1938), 
quoted, ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, EvOLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 244, 245. To the 
same effect as the first statement: Amp. Petr6leos Mexicanos, 71 S.J.F. 2095,2098 (1942). 
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As with us, the biggest strikes, or threats of strikes, tend to 
reach the desk of the President (or the Secretary of Labor) for 
settlement. Trueba states that these interventions have favored the 
interests of the workers.222 As a union advocate, he has misgivings 
about them, as "these governmental activities to an extent impede 
the right to strike in counteracting by itself the economic force 
of the capitalist class." However, he continues, "the social rights 
of the working person have not suffered mutilation, and the devel-
opment of the workers has been progressive." 
Occasionally the government has taken over strike-bound prop-
erties, and in a few instances troops have been used. There are 
even legal provisions that the government can turn plants over to 
the workers.223 While these laws have an ominous sound, it is hard 
to conceive of their having any practical importance, because of 
financial inability upon the part of workers to take over a business 
and run it. 224 
The Labor Law provides for operation by the government of an 
extensive department for the defense of labor (Procuraduria de 
la Defensa del Trabajo), to render free advice and representation 
to individual workers and to unions. 225 The government gave the 
union of government employees land for the erection of a million-
peso headquarters building. 226 
222 ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, Evowci6N DE LA HuELGA (1950) 330. 
223 Ley de Expropiacion y Ocupacion de Bienes and Ley de Vias Generales de 
Comunicacion. 
224 That such provisions, state and federal, have not been entirely without effect: 
CLARK, ORGANIZED LABOR IN MEXICO (1934) 249, 263; 2 MARIO DE LA CuEvA, DERECHO 
MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 891. A factory in San Luis Potosi expropriated by 
the government so that it could be operated by the workers as a co-operative went into 
bankruptcy, notwithstanding tax exemption as a co-operative. "Quebr6 una Fabrica en 
Manos de los Obreros," Mexico City Excelsior, May 5, 1951, p. 25A. A Mexico City-
Veracruz truck line which had been strike-bound for five months was turned over by 
the employers to the workers to be operated by them. "Empresa que ha sido Entregada," 
id., Oct. 19, 1950, p. 33. 
225 §§ 407-413. Discussed, and Regulations governing the Department set forth: 4 
ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, DERECHO PROCESAL DEL TRABAJO (1944) 293-312. For report 
of its activities: 1950 MEMORIA DE LABORES DE LA SECRETARIA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISION 
SociAL, pp. 169-175. 
226 "Gran Edificio Construira la Federacion de Trabajadores Bur6cratas en Lucerna 
y Lisboa," Mexico City Excelsior, Sept. 2, 1950, § 3, p. 11. 
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14. CoMPULSORY ARBITRA TION227 
Here we have an important difference from the situation in this 
country- in Mexico the employers are in favor of compulsory 
arbitration/28 and the unions opposed, whereas with us capital 
joins labor in opposition. How Mexican employers, in the milieu 
of their country, can expect not to be the losers through govern-
mentally administered arbitration, I cannot understand. De la 
Cueva, however, thinks that they will gain, as compared with 
labor, because of the protection afforded by their impenetrable 
"mysterious" systems of accounting.229 
Compulsory arbitration is, of course, the antithesis of the dearly 
achieved and highly prized right to strike. De la Cueva contends 
that obligatory settlement of labor disputes necessarily involves 
control of prices, and that this in turn means an economy directed 
by the state.230 He says that the free men of democratic countries 
battle against such a solution, and that this explains why compul-
sory arbitration exists only under dictatorships, the experience of 
France having proved the inefficacy of attempting to establish it 
in a democracy. 
Eduardo Pallares, son of the famous Jacinto Pallares, and pos-
sibly the most brilliant Mexican legal writer of all time, has said 
that "the right to strike is to the industrial anarchy of modern 
times what the duel was to the regime of feudal anarchy."231 An-
other Mexican attorney wrote a hook the thesis of which is that 
the right to strike is inconsistent with a state of law.232 A Mexican 
social economist has said: 
227 In general: 2 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 
1949) 877-891; ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, EvoLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 308-331. 
228 ALB,ERTO TRUEBA URBINA, EVOLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 309, 327. 
220 2 DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 890. 
2ao /d. at 889. 
2a1 DERECHO DE HuELGA (1923) 5, quoted, ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, EvoLUCION DE 
LA HUELGA (1950) 323. 
2a2 CARLOS RoEL, EsT ADO DE DERECHO o HUELGA (1942), discussed, ALBERTO TRUEBA 
URBINA, EVOLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 316, 328. 
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The capitalist economic organization will never be able to effect a 
form which will harmonize the factors of production. The clashes be-
tween the classes will form a series which only a radical change in the 
political-economic regime will interrupt, and they will be necessary as 
a preparation for that new regime.233 
Trueba, the brilliant legal and political protagonist of labor, 
gets into a fighting frame of mind when thinking about any pos· 
sible abolition of the right to strike (he does not object to restric-
tions in connection with the Labor Board machinery234 ) : 
Many would desire that the right to strike be suppressed or strangled, 
without stopping to think that this would bring with it the transforma· 
tion of the capitalist economic regime that they are defending; and 
would, indeed, precipitate the social revolution, and, in consequence, 
the expedition of a socialist constitution.235 
[the closing words of his book on strikes] In the future, the strike is 
not only a hope of the proletariat for the transformation of the capi-
talist regime, but the touchstone of the social revolution.236 
Trueba has summed up his philosophy as follows: 
Throughout the history of our country and its institutions we can 
observe the exercise of the free life becoming manifest, step by step: 
that the right to strike is the first segment of the circle which liberty 
involves; the second is the right to defend labor; the third is the right 
to participate in the formation of the rules governing labor; the fourth 
is the right to share in the profit from labor; and the fifth is the right 
to govern by virtue of labor.237 
Possibly I should state that I believe that society will find it 
necessary to extend the judicial processes to include labor prob-
lems, and that it will be possible to do this without far-reaching 
consequences and without prejudice to either side. 
233 MIGUEL A. QUINTANA, EcoNoMiA SociAL (1937) 169, quoted, ALBERTO TRUEBA 
URBINA, Evowci6N DE LA HuELGA (1950) 322. 
234 EvoLUCION DE LA HUELGA (1950) 330. 
235 I d. at 327. See also id. at 5, 29, 309, 313, 323, 330. 
236 I d. at 331. 
237 I d. at 329. 
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15. FUTURE CHANGEs238 
The Mexican Labor Law as a statute does not excite the constant 
and intense interest that our Taft-Hartley Law does. In addition 
to profit·sharing and compulsory reinstatement of workers, 
already treated at length herein, and the perennial desire of some 
for compulsory arbitration, there has been popular discussion of 
the following subjects, with a view to possible changes in the 
Labor Law, or in the Regulations thereunder (Trueba being a cen-
tral figure in the discussions within the governing political party) : 
Apprenticeship (to prevent being used as means of exploita-
tion). 
Central unions. 
Code of Labor Law Procedure. 
Extension of the strike notice period from six to ten days, and 
more effective provisions to prevent work stoppages before the 
expiration of the period. 
Formation of corporations to evade Labor Law. 
Houses and schools (supplying by employers) . 
Increase in maximum workmen's compensation daily payments 
to actual wage received. 
Labor Code. 
Minimum wage. 
More effective requirements to insure actual efforts by the 
parties to reach an agreement before the Labor Boards. 
Obligatory contracts ( contratos-ley). 
Prevention of arbitration by President. 
Protection of workers not paid wages or who are self-employed. 
Repeal of provisions relating to small businesses (because of 
28 8 For predictions of change of a more general character, see Cormack & Barker, 
The Mexican Labor Law, 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 251,293 (1934). 
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splitting up of large enterprises in order to take advantage of 
them). 
Restraining the actions of irresponsible union leaders, particu-
larly through formation of "straw" unions. 
Revision of contracts, particularly the biennial system. 
Sweatshops, all "labor in homes" (abolition urged). 
Trueba has in mind widespread reforms in the Constitution, 
including changing the name to the Political-Social (Politico-
social) Constitution. 239 
289 "Plan de Reformas Generales a la Constitucion," Mexico City Excelsior, Dec. 
27, 1950, p. 1. 
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